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ABSTRACT
Thinking in France on relations between crime rate trend and evolution of socio-econo-
mic context over time is underdeveloped. Recent studies in the United Kingdom suggest
that the business cycle influences fluctuations in both property offenses and violent crime.
Whereas pre-1970 research in the United States only rarely pointed up a direct link between
crime rate and unemployment, post-1970 American studies are dominated by demonstra-
tions of a direct correlation between the two. In this article, analysis of trends in unemploy-
ment, prices and wages, marriage among men, and schooling leads to an interpretation of
delinquency and crime over the long term in which it is affirmed that an increase in opportu-
nity, such as that attested to by increased consumer prices and wages over time, has a more
pronounced role in the strong growth period of the cycle and influences property offenses
more than violent crime, and that unemployment among young people without educational
degrees is a factor working in favor of both theft and violent crime. This phenomenon was
partially masked in periods where it was common to remain in the school system, such as
early in the last decade of the twentieth century in France. Lastly, the fact that starting in the
early 1980s fewer young people settled in couples and, more generally, the tension in rela-
tions between the sexes may also have worked to favor delinquency.
Thinking on relations between trends in rates of all varieties of crime and
evolution of socio-economic context is seriously underdeveloped in France.
The idea that crime is linked to a crisis in the political and moral order, a loss
of orientation and guiding values, often prevails, though it would be difficult
to put a date on it. Among the few researchers who have examined the recent
past, T. Godefroy and B. Laffargue (1985), following the tradition begun by
G. Rusche and O. Kirchheimer (1939), emphasized links between crime rate
and variations in prison population, but found no relation between crime rate
and economic context. (1) In the absence of empirical studies, we in France
have generally settled for dutiful rhetorical allusions to the possible influence
of socio-economic motives or reasons. It is also true that many observers be-
lieve administrative statistics do not provide reliable information about the
extent of criminal acts. Moreover, undertaking to analyze the relations be-
tween crime rate and socio-economic context is often interpreted as a way of
reducing the problem to “the determinant, ineluctable effect of poverty”. This
is obviously not what is at issue. Developments in wages, consumer prices,
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(1) “On the basis of our examination of
these results, we cannot conclude with certainty
that unemployment affects reported crime.”
(Godefroy and Laffargue, 1985, p. 44).
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and unemployment also determine the conditions under which social cohesion
can be maintained; in other words, our reasons for agreeing to live together in
relative peace.
In contrast to the French research situation, English-language literature on
crime rate trends is very rich. The very wealth of studies in the United States
–T. Chiricos (1987) listed 63 quantitative studies from 1960 to 1986– seems
an obstacle to an effective overview. American researchers were led naturally
enough to formulate the hypothesis that the conditions for an expansion of
crime are defined by socio-economic context, particularly the existence of a
potentially delinquent population and the great number of delinquency oppor-
tunities. Inspired by rational actor theory, many American studies stress the
importance of crime-associated risks, especially degree of certainty of legal
sanctions and sentence severity. (2) The literature on this point was not very
conclusive (Garland, 1990), and ties between crime and economic context
began to be explored in a more general way, though rational actor theories
remain central. Two other approaches for interpreting trends are more stimu-
lating in my view than calculating risk associated with criminal acts: L. Cohen
and M Felson’s in their 1979 study, and research inspired by R. K. Merton.
Cohen and Felson inquired into the consequences of prosperity –the relative
abundance of “prey”– but also its effects on lifestyle: people go out more often,
residences are not as well protected, and this facilitates casual delinquency.
From a broader theoretical perspective, R. K. Merton emphasized motives
for getting started on a criminal career and reasons for continuing one –what
may be called criminal “supply”. While the volume of crime may increase be-
cause occasions for illegally appropriating property have, it may also increase
due to an increase in the fraction of the population excluded from employ-
ment. In the interpretation he proposed in 1938, Merton hypothesized that
most delinquents do not have different aims in life than law-abiding citizens.
These aims may be expressed as money and recognition, in varying propor-
tions. Delinquents and criminals, however, use different means than most citi-
zens for achieving them. He suggests that from the point of view of the
society as a whole rather than at the scale of the individual, the fraction of the
population attracted to criminal activity depends on the possibilities people
have to live by legal means compared to those deriving from the use of illegal
means. This should be understood in the broadest sense: costs are not solely
economic and the choice does not concern the rationality of criminal acts
evaluated one by one but rather choosing or rejecting this type of activity alto-
gether.
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(2) For a whole current of research in the
United States, crime volume depends on the
risks involved in committing criminal acts – as
if occasions for stealing, for example, were
uniformly abundant and crime was just one
economic activity among others. From this
perspective, the volume of property crime is
associated with an opportunity cost that
non-specialized actors are assumed to assess.
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Merton’s approach, which implies not only looking at crime rate fluctua-
tions over the short term but using those fluctuations to discover how delin-
quency is regulated over the long term, has elicited a great number of
empirical studies, the results of which are not all concurrent. The literature
suggests that relations between crime rate and economic context were diffe-
rent in the last quarter of the twentieth century than in the context immedia-
tely following World War II. (3) For the period from 1946 to 1982, D. Cantor
and K. Land (1985) found an inverse relation between increased unemploy-
ment and crime. While prior to 1970 researchers rarely pointed up a direct
connection between crime and unemployment, since that time, research has
been dominated by findings of a direct correlation between the two. S. Carlson
and R. Michalovsky (1993) theorized this evolution of the correlations by
showing that the links between violent crime and unemployment depend on
historical period. (4)
Studies by S. Field (1990) have a major place in the United Kingdom. For
Field, the business cycle influences fluctuations in both property offenses,
which he is most interested in, and violent crime. In the mid-1980s Field ana-
lyzed a series of relative variations, validating above all the idea that theft
generally increases with a relative decline in real consumption and decreases
when consumption rises: increased incentive to engage in criminal activity is
therefore the preponderant cause of increased crime.
Pursuing Field’s analyses, D. J. Pyle and D. F. Deadman (1994) empha-
sized the need to take into account long-term delinquency regulation.
D. Dickinson (1994) concurrently underlined an aspect that had not before
been empirically validated in the United Kingdom: the strength of correla-
tions between juvenile delinquency and unemployment. Dickinson showed
the existence of links between opportunistic delinquency (burglary) and low
employment among adolescent boys. He underlined that it was in poor re-
gions, those most affected by industrial decline in the 1980s and 90s, that op-
portunistic crime and drug abuse increased most rapidly.
C. Hale in a recent article (1998) adopts most of Field’s conclusions, but
also underlines that by reasoning in terms of relative variations, Field failed to
take into account long-term influences. (5) Recommending use of error correc-
tion models, Hale affirms that trends in theft are tied to consumption, and that
while employment does not influence criminal trends, it does explain some
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(3) A contrast could also be established
with the nineteenth century, when crime
spontaneously drew observers’ attention to the
effects of drinking – and only afterward, along
this path, to consumer prices (Zehr, 1976).
(4) The ambivalence of American results on
the link between crime and unemployment are
related to the fact that the job market in the
United States functions quite differently than in
most European countries. The literature can
produce contradictory impressions. Absence of
relation obviously isn’t the same thing as
pointing up a link. In effect, absence of relation
does not allow us to conclude that the variable
in question does not affect crime; it may be the
result of specification errors or inadequate
measuring data.
(5) Hale gives elaborate technical accounts
of Pyle and Deadman’s analyses, criticizing
them for overdifferentiating their time-series
and therefore not picking up certain relational
tendencies.
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short-term fluctuations (deficit of socio-economic integration possibilities in
the short term). In the Netherlands, C. Beki, K. Zeelenberg, and K. Van
Monfort (1999), using an approach similar to Hale’s, interpret consumption
fluctuations as a motivating effect: when consumption per person increases,
material gain can more readily be legal and there is less incentive to steal.
Another series of studies, also inspired by Merton’s thinking and using for
the most part synchronic cross-sections, works to specify the links between
income inequality and crime (as these studies are not clearly temporal I will
only mention them here). In the United States, S. Danziger and D. Wheeler
(1975) showed that income inequalities were associated with a high level of
theft and burglary. And though E. Paterson (1991) failed to confirm the exis-
tence of a link between income disparities and crime, R. Fowles and M.
Merva (1996) found a strong correlation between such disparities and homi-
cidal violence for the 1975-90 period. (6) A number of United Kingdom stud-
ies on income disparities and delinquency suggest a link between crime and
weakened social cohesion as expressed by income distribution. R. Witt et al.
(1999), for example, affirm that an increase in income inequality (measured
on the basis of wage-earning surveys) influences levels of burglary and vio-
lent theft.
In my treatment of French data I have adopted an approach inspired by
Hale’s analyses while being careful to represent influences deriving from em-
ployment trends with specific variables, thereby making it possible to add
them to the explanatory models without confusing them with what Field calls
the motivating effects of trend in consumption level.
Increased consumption, like decreased consumption for that matter, can
have opposite effects on theft. 1) An increase in real consumption indicates an
increased volume of goods to be stolen: there are more occasions to steal.
2) This same increase, however –implying an increase in nominal wage in re-
lation to prices– means that criminal activity becomes less profitable com-
pared to legal activity, and this in turn reduces incentive to steal. The first is
an opportunity effect deriving from what is there to be stolen; the second is a
motivational one, affecting how disposed one may or may not be to seek ille-
gal resources.
The motivating effect is directly related to evolution of the job market. For
the last two decades, job market trend has correlated with crime, particularly
juvenile delinquency. If we establish categories of unemployed persons, speci-
fying age and educational degree level, the correlation between fluctuations in
theft on the one hand and unemployment on the other is striking (see Appen-
dix I). It is natural to think that the situation of the least skilled young per-
sons, rather than that of young persons with educational degrees, influences
delinquency. Unemployment is clearly to be included among conditions that
favor delinquency: by reducing access to legal status, unemployment in-
creases motives for committing illegal acts (theft and violent crime) and re-
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(6) They analyzed cross-sections, so results vary by size of territorial segment studied.
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moves obstacles in the way of so acting. This suggests that we should
examine whether fluctuations in the mass of thefts depend not only on occa-
sions for stealing but also on fluctuations in employment, and thus on the
number of persons to whom delinquency seems the most accessible path.
Sources
In France, time series for crime represent the aggregate of acts recorded by
the police and gendarmerie. The number of such acts does not depend prima-
rily on the initiative of the forces of law and order, but on victim-filed charges
that are then realized in the form of police reports according to precise crite-
ria. These social constructions reflect the pressure of delinquency and crime,
how important it is to victims to file charges, victims’ anticipation of authori-
ties’ response, and lastly the various ways events are apprehended by the po-
lice and gendarmes, as observable in the final reports. Victimization surveys,
which have developed only recently in France, provide indicators that have
their own qualities and biases (see Robert et al., 1999). There are few of them,
and this makes it impossible for the time being to use them as an instrument in
chronological studies.
For the long period under study here, 1950 to 1997, we have only two syn-
thetic indicators: theft, and violent crime, referred to in France as crimes
against persons. In the last quarter of the twentieth century, an effort was
made to systematize data collection by the police and gendarmerie, giving rise
to an annual publication, Aspects de la criminalité en France, which uses 107
indices describing property offenses, violence and threats of violence, distur-
bance of public order and regulations abuses, particularly financial illegality
and narcotics offenses. Only a few stably defined main categories can be used
effectively to represent essential delinquency and crime trends. I have chosen
to limit myself to predation and violence and will only be considering theft,
violent theft, and assault and battery (see Appendix III).
I used time series published by Robert et al. in Les comptes du crime
(1994) and, for 1995 to 1997, in the Annuaire statistique de la justice 1999, to
calculate proportion of prison sentences of more than one year. Duration of
prison sentences, which is nearly unaffected by pardons, was taken into ac-
count to see if expectations on legal sanctions based on severity of sentencing
observed in the past acted as a deterrent. I did not, however, use variables on
degree of certainty about legal sanctions; this would have been too difficult
given the state of available statistics. (7)
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(7) French time series on time served in
prison are so affected by political components
that they are extremely difficult to use.
Pardons, of which a vast number were given in
1981 and 1988 [successive elections of the
socialist president François Mitterrand],
seriously disrupt the figures.
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To show consumption trend I used three indices: consumer price, average
net wage, and consumption volume. (8) INSEE’s long time series for unem-
ployment, tabulated by age and educational level, were also used, as well as
indexes for manual worker unemployment and overall unemployment rates as
defined by the Bureau International du Travail.
For interpreting trends, I have introduced an indicator of first marriage for
men and a schooling index; cross-section studies and some of my previous re-
search suggest that these factors intervene as regulators of delinquent activity
(Lagrange, 1998). For schooling I have used the time series on the length of
time young persons remain in school as calculated by the Ministry of Educa-
tion’s Département de la Programmation et du Développement, and for first
marriage rates among men the raw-data rates regularly published by the
Institut National d’Études Démographiques in Population.
Methods
Long time series are precious for the historian. With the great amounts of
information they contain, they offer the possibility of pointing up changes in
regulation of the crime phenomenon over time. But they also pose a formida-
ble statistical problem, the fact that they are not stationary. A time series is
said to be stationary when average and variance are constant over time and
therefore do not depend on length of observation period. (9) Most time-series
are not stationary.
To counter the risk of spurious regression due to non-stationary series, two
solutions are currently proposed. 1) Differentiating time series so that residu-
als are stationary, then applying regression analysis to the differences (ie, if Xt
represents crime rate at time t, using ∆Xt= Xt-Xt-1 instead of Xt). But then
long-run relationships that may well exist between business cycle and crime
rate don’t show up. 2) In response to this problem several researchers have
suggested using error correction models (Engel and Granger, 1987). This is a
two-step process. First, a “naive” regression is performed on undifferentiated
time series whose residuals are generally autocorrelated; residuals are then
analyzed and a second regression, appropriate to the nature of the residuals, is
performed on the now differentiated time series by injecting values from
which the residuals of the initial model have been obtained (see Appendix II).
Introducing a trend effect or corrector effect in this way adds “long-term
memory”, as provided by the analysis of rough crime rate series, to short-term
determinations. In the last regressions, residuals should no longer be
autocorrelated.
34
Revue française de sociologie
(8) The first is an index of 295 items
published by the Institut National de la
Statistique et des Études Économiques (INSEE)
(1970 for 100 base); the second is INSEE’s
“1998 retrospective” series on average net
wages; the third the consumption volume index
at 1980 prices (my thanks to L. Cazes at INSEE
for making the index available to me).
(9) More exactly, when covariances for a
given time lapse are determined solely by this
lapse.
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Crime trend
The two long time series used here –theft and violent crime– show an in-
crease over the second half of the twentieth century that stands in contrast to
the decrease in delinquency and crime observed between the late nineteenth
and mid-twentieth centuries. Analogous developments, with discrepancies of
a few years, may be observed in the United Kingdom, United States, and
Germany (the peak for property crime in America was 1981, three years ear-
lier than in France). This means that one overall context seems to have shaped
crime rate trends in all these countries, regardless of their institutional differ-
ences. In France the rate of violent crime was stable from 1950 to 1975 at
around 1.5 offenses per 1,000 persons, began increasing in the early 1980s,
and, after a brief drop at the end of the decade, increased at an accelerated rate
during the 1990s. This profile differs from that for theft, which increased
sharply starting in the second half of the 1950-74 period of rapid economic
growth, inflation, and low unemployment known as the Trente Glorieuses,
and more slightly over the last quarter century, reaching a peak in the
mid-1980s, then undergoing ample fluctuations to the end of the period with-
out any clearly marked trend. (10)
Crime rate during the Trente Glorieuses was characterized by rapidly in-
creasing property offenses (after the low-water mark immediately following
World War II) –four times more thefts proportionate to the population– and
near stagnation in violent crime (to the left of the vertical line in Figure I).
Theft rates began to go up with the increase in economic activity in the
mid-1950s.
During the last quarter of the century (to the right of the vertical line in
Figure I), increase in theft slowed and starting in the mid-1980s, stagnated.
Violent crime, on the other hand, which began to rise later than theft, pro-
gressed at an accelerated rate in the course of the 1980s. These contrasted dy-
namics for theft and violence over the last 50 years are, in my opinion,
symptomatic of two distinct, temporally overlapping crime regimes: crime
due to opportunity during the strong growth period, and crime due to eco-
nomic exclusion during the last quarter of the century.
If we consider fundamental economic and social trends, the last half of the
century is split in two. The Trente Glorieuses were followed by a period of
high unemployment and slowed growth (1975-98). This is attested to by varia-
tions in theft on the one hand, consumer prices on the other. While there is a
clear correlation between the profiles of price increases and theft from 1952
to 1997 (r = 0.55, p < 0.001), closer examination shows that in the individual
years 1952 to 1976 an increase in one regularly corresponded to a decrease in
35
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(10) While overall trends for theft and
violent crime are correlated, annual variations
in the series are nearly unrelated. Whether this
means that short-term motives for theft differ
from those for violent crime or that conditions
for acting in the two cases did not coincide, this
is quite a remarkable fact, one that indicates the
limits of conceiving crime as a unified
phenomenon.
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the other while during the second period, 1977-97, overall time-series trends
and annual fluctuations alike are synchronic (Figure II). (11)
36
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FIGURE I. – Theft rate (per 1,000) and violent crime rate (per 10,000)
(11) Second differences show a negative
coefficient for the first period, if very small:
-0.12, and a positive coefficient for the second:
0.30.
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FIGURE II. – Theft and consumer prices (first differences)
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TABLE I. – Stage 1: regressions on undifferentiated series for theft
Independent variables Thefts*t Theftst
Period 1950-97 1950-97
Constant 2.7 4.6
Pricest 0.36
(8.3)**
Pricest-1
-0.29
(6.5)
Average wage for ment 0.19
(12)
Average wage for ment-1 -0.16
(10)
R
2
0.97 0.98
F significant at 0.0001 0.0001
Durbin-Watson 0.59 0.85
* The time series used as dependent variable is theft rate during year t: number of thefts in proportion to
population.
** Student’s t values are given in parentheses; when t is over 2, the coefficient is significant at the 5% level.
TABLE II. – Stage 2: regression on differentiated series for theft: error correction models
(columns 1, 2, and 3), difference models (columns 4 and 5)
Independent variables ∆*(Thefts)t
(1)
∆(Thefts)t
(2)
∆(Thefts)t
(3)
∆(Thefts)t
(4)
∆(Thefts)t
(5)
Period 1950-97 1970-97 1970-97 1970-97 1970-97
Constant -0.01 2.22 3.58 -3.3 0.9
∆(prices)t 16.5**
(3.9)
13.9**
(4.0)
0.06
(2.1)
∆(prices)t-1 0.07
(2.5)
∆(net wage rate, men)t 0.14
(1.8)
∆(unemployment rate 15-24
without degree)t
2.01
(2.7)
0.41
(2.5)
0.26
(3.1)
0.15
(1.6)
Unemployment rate 15-24,
CEP level (primary school) ***
-0.21
(3.9)
-0.22
(3.0)
Unemployment rate 15-24,
CAP/BEP (vocational degrees)
/baccalauréat (general high school
degree) level
-1.75
(2.1)
-0.33
(1.7)
0.25
(2.0)
First marriage, men (reversed) 1.8
(2.5)
3.4
(2.4)
Residualst-1 -0.25
(2.0)
Residualst-2 -0.47
(5.1)
-1.7
(3.5)
R
2
0.51 0.70 0.66 0.69 0.67
F significant at 0.0001 0.0001 0.0006 0.0001 0.0001
Durbin-Watson 2.0 2.1 1.7 2.6 2.2
*∆ Designates the differentiation operator; thus ∆(thefts)t = theftst – theftst-1 ; ∆(prices)t-1 = pricest-1 – pricest-2,
etc.
** Logarithm of price index.
*** Time index omitted for non-lagged series.
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This fracture in the post-World War II period is not specific to crime. The
two periods were very different in terms not only of economic indicators but
other aspects of social life. First marriage rates, fairly stable until 1970, fell
rapidly from that date until 1985-86, after which we see fluctuations that seem
the reverse mirror image of unemployment and crime rate fluctuations. The
institution of marriage is a major social regulator, and we can observe that its
decline, preceded by the decline in birth rates, fairly coincided with the end of
the high growth years and an increase in violent crime and suicide (see
Bourgoin, 1999; Chauvel, 1997; Besnard, 1997).
Theft, prices, and unemployment
Analysis of relations between theft rate and economic fluctuations for the
1950-97 period is seriously hampered by the absence in France of long time
series. I looked at consumer price and average wage indexes as well as first
marriage rates for the period, and the consumption volume index for the
1960-97 period. The unemployment time series used here only begin in 1968
and were introduced only in the second stage of the analysis. (12)
Table I presents regressions on the rough time series, whose residuals were
then used in regressions on differentiated time-series. Though the coefficients
of determination (R2) are high, the model is very simplistic. The price coeffi-
cient at period t is positive and significant, while the price coefficient at t-1 is
negative, which is similar to a direct effect of first difference in prices. The
residuals show a high level of autocorrelation, reflecting trend amplitude and
relative inertia. The net wage index coefficients are strictly analogous. Con-
sumption volume, however, the variable that accounts most precisely for real
consumption, has no significant coefficients when introduced into the regres-
sion; nor does first marriage rate for men.
For the second stage, I used simple time-series differentiation (Table II,
columns 4 and 5) concurrently with error correction models (Table II,
columns 1, 2, and 3), despite the concommitant information loss, given
that the number of points is relatively low.
At this stage, regardless of models used –error correction or differentiation–
I used first differences for the crime time series, which suffices given that the
correlogram for residuals shows significant coefficients at t-1 but few at t-2 or
for longer time lags (see Appendix II). (13) The “residuals” variable refers to
the residuals of the regressions performed on variables in the first stage,
lagged one or two periods. In two out of three cases (columns 1 and 2), resi-
dual coefficients are sharply significant, suggesting that increase in theft did
not depend solely on short-term price fluctuations but also on overall move-
ment for the set of indices, as estimated by regression on the undifferentiated
38
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(12) See INSEE, Marché du travail [Job
market], long time series, 1998.
(13) Thus suggesting degree-one
cointegration.
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time series. The models estimated in this second stage show nearly no
autocorrelation for residuals, a validation criterion for the error correction
models. Using average wage index in place of price index tends to weaken
coefficient significance. Moreover, I did not obtain a satisfactory model of
developments in theft increase rate using consumption volume or real wage
index.
When retail price or wage index rises, theft rate also rises, with direct ef-
fects of price or wage variations attenuated by gap from the trend as estimated
on the undifferentiated time series one or two years earlier. In other words,
while price or wage increase moves additional persons to engage in delin-
quency or intensifies the activity of practicing delinquents, increase in theft
will be moderated by inertia for new delinquency starts, which adjusts itself to
previous wage and price variable levels. This suggests that perhaps more than
ordinary activity, delinquent behavior, motivated by expectation of profit, is
subject to limits on “stock”: there is a cost to getting started in delinquent ac-
tivity and it is difficult to get out of such activity; this affects behavior with
inertia, as attested to by the strong autocorrelation for rough time series.
From 1970 to 1997, while fluctuations in theft rate continued to depend on
changes in wages and prices, they were strongly affected by employment pos-
sibilities for young persons without educational degree. In my testing of se-
veral unemployment indices, those for males aged 15 to 24, and particularly
for males in this age group without degrees, were systematically the best-fitting:
short-term variations in unemployment rate for this group are associated with
variations in the same direction for theft. That fit is improved if we introduce
employment rates for young persons with degrees, anywhere from the CEP
(Certificat d’Études Primaires) [primary school] to the baccalauréat [general
high school leaving exam]. “With educational degree” unemployment rate in-
dicators systematically have at least a negative coefficient and intervene as
correctors, whereas the “without educational degree” unemployment rate al-
ways shows a positive coefficient. Though increases in unemployment affect
both categories of young person, the negative coefficient for the rate among
the former (the degree could be as low as a BEP [Brevet d’Études
Professionnelles, a slightly higher vocational degree than the CAP]) mode-
rates theft growth rate. Likewise, in variants 4 and 5, the relative increase in
theft rate is pulled up by price rate, unemployment rate among young persons
without degree, and decrease in marriage.
While first marriage rate helps explain theft increase, it seems to me less
specific than the effect of unemployment and price rates because it may be
thought of as induced in part by economic context. When a variable represen-
ting prison sentence length was introduced into the regressions –length in-
creased greatly through 1997– the coefficient was in most cases significant;
nonetheless, it was also positive, making it hard to see prison sentence length
as a motive. This confirms the idea that in a period when number of persons
apprehended by the law remained stable due to decline of crime elucidation
rates, the increased length of prison sentences was more a response to the in-
crease of crime pressure than a factor of deterrence.
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These results lead us to reexamine the meaning of the relations pointed up
for the English context by Field and Hale, and specify interpretation of my
own results. Field and Hale suggested that theft develops when consumption
diminishes or grows slowly and, conversely, decreases when consumption in-
creases rapidly. For them the short-term effect of improved economic context
is less incentive to steal, and this effect supplants the increased criminal
opportunity brought about by the increased volume of goods and services
exchanged. It is curious that they should emphasize the importance of con-
sumption if in fact they are suggesting not an opportunity effect but rather the
strength of incentives to act within the law or outside it. Unemployment rate
seems a more direct measure than consumption of how hard it is to find or
come back into legal sources of income.
Though I agree with Field that socio-economic context helps regulate pro-
perty crime, it seems to me that the relations between theft on the one hand
and consumption and employment fluctuations on the other were not the same
during the last quarter of the twentieth century as during the Trente
Glorieuses. I have isolated a clear unemployment effect in the former period,
which suggests that we were then no longer in a context where “opportunity
makes the thief” but rather one where the difficulty of finding legal work in-
creased the number of potential delinquents, intensity of criminal activity, or
both. It is also true that when Field undertook his research in the mid-1980s
the effects of unemployment were not as sharp.
Furthermore, it is the variables representing not real activity volume but
nominal wage and price changes, and this over the entire period as well as
during the last quarter of the century, that are most closely associated with in-
crease and fluctuations in theft. Relative increase in consumer prices and
nominal income does not reflect variations in exchange volume; rather it pro-
vides the basis for actors’ expectations. The inflation attested to by increase in
consumer prices is a measure of the amputation representing “real income”
compared to income anticipated on the basis of nominal wages; it can there-
fore be read as an index of relative deprivation –disappointed expectations.
From this perspective, we can affirm that in periods of prosperity, delin-
quency is increased by frustrated consumption expectations or plans, as much
as by increase in exchange volume. Interpreting delinquency as frustration
thus supports Merton’s hypothesis. We could also conceive of nominal varia-
tions in wages and prices as indices of a context in which social life is more
intense and people’s lifestyle increases their exposure to crime: they are care-
free and spend more, even though their buying power has in fact deteriorated
(see Cohen and Felson, 1979).
Violence: “crime against persons”, violent theft, assault and battery
I studied fluctuations in violent crime using the same procedure as for
theft. I did not, however, use time series on homicide, which, though they cor-
relate closely with violent theft, represent such a different and indeed such a
40
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rare phenomenon in France that it has no place in this study. The curve for
assault and battery, on the other hand, where the recent trend is one of expo-
nential increase, differs from that for theft.
The proportion of violent crimes committed by young people suggests that
we should take into account motives for acting violently, factors that might
affect actors’ readiness to commit such a crime for the first time. Dispositions
in France favoring prolonged schooling were able for a time to slow or attenu-
ate the stimulus to crime constituted by unemployment. It is suggestive to
compare data on how long young persons remain in school with that for juve-
nile delinquency. As schooling became longer, number of pupils leaving the
school system fell below number of pupils of school-leaving age: “This was
the case from 1988 to 1994, when length of schooling increased by 0.2 of a
year per year.” (Mini and Poulet, 1999). In 1992, when a generation of
850,000 had reached school leaving age, only 700,000 left; the “staying in
school” coefficient was 18%. Between 1974 and 1981, when “staying in
school” decreased, the number of minors reported by the police to be involved
in criminal activity strongly increased. Conversely, when “staying in school”
rates were their highest –1988 to 1993– this number stagnated (Figure III).
As for theft, I used error correction models. Regressions were first per-
formed on undifferentiated time series, then by reinjecting residuals into a
model of first differences. (14) For the undifferentiated time series, the effects
41
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FIGURE III. – Juvenile delinquency and level of staying in school
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(14) The correlograms for residuals only present significant values for a time lapse of one
period, making it advisable not to go beyond first differences.
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of staying in school on violent theft and assault and battery are significant: the
decrease in the former is associated with an increase in violence; the converse
is also the case. This effect is not mediated by unemployment. Such results
suggest that the increase in number of delinquent minors over the period had
an effect on violence volume: minors constituted the highest proportion of
both violents and victims of violence (Table III).
While the quality of these differentiated series regressions is below that for
theft, the effects of variations in unemployment among young persons without
degree and variations in “staying in school” are significant in the expected
sense (Table IV).
Though crimes against persons, violent theft, and assault and battery are
more autonomous in relation to economic context than theft, they too are af-
fected by price variations, variations in unemployment among young persons
without educational degree, and prolonged schooling. We should probably not
try to interpret the fact that first marriage rates influence only assault and bat-
tery; this particularity is inherent to such analyses. Given that interpretive (ie,
independent) variables are partially interchangeable indices whose relative
consistency alone gives validity to the argument, more weight should be given
in interpretation to which variables are implicated and relational directions
than nuances in relation specification.
Motivation for violent acts has to do with delinquency “supply”. The varia-
bles combine in explanatory configurations that are similar to those for theft,
but staying in school, the effects of which were incorporated into the lagged
residuals, plays a role in explaining the violent crime trend that it did not have
42
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TABLE III. – Stage 1: regressions on rough series for violent crime
Independent variables
Crimes against
persons
(1)
Violent theft
(2)
Assault and
battery
(3)
Period 1950-97 1972-97 1972-97
Constant -1.35 0.11 0.62
Pricest
0.31
(3.9)
0.002
(8.1)
Pricest-1
-0.005
(3.1)
Pricest-2
0.007
(3.8)
Unemployment rate 15-24 without degree _* 0.006
(1.9)
Staying in school rate _* -0.006
(2.0)
-0.013
(3.6)
First marriage rate (reversed) 0.5
(3.3)
R
2
0.84 0.96 0.86
F significant at 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Durbin-Watson 0.3 0.6 0.7
*Figures unavailable for these periods.
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for theft. Price variable coefficients were not as strong or significant here as
for theft over the long term. This supports the idea that the type of interpreta-
tion I have proposed here, not narrowly based on crime type but referring
instead to general conditions for delinquency, is defined primarily by the po-
tential number of young people moved by resentment, not by volume of
opportunity for committing such acts.
*
* *
The increase in opportunities to commit crimes, as attested to by consumer
price and wage trends, played a major role during last century’s strong growth
period, though it influenced property crime rate more than violent crime rate.
Though my analyses for that period could not be strictly comparable to those
done on data for the last quarter of the century, the intensity of price variable
coefficients suggests that “opportunity” logic predominated from 1950 to
1975 and gave crime the meaning of a tax levied on prosperity. During the
1975-97 recession, unemployment among young people without educational
degrees was a factor favoring both theft and violence. This phenomenon was
probably partially masked during periods when prolonged time in school indi-
rectly influenced the situation of the least “diplomaed” young people. It came
into full swing, however, during the last decade of the century. Lastly, tension
in relations between the sexes, of which reduced marriage rates provide a very
rough index and which intervenes autonomously along with economic-context
indices, may also have stimulated an increase in delinquency starting in the
1980s.
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TABLE IV. – Stage 2: regressions on series for violent crime: error correction models
Independent variables
∆(crimes against
persons)t
(1)
∆(violent
theft)t
(2)
∆(assault and
battery)t
(3)
Period 1968-1997 1972-1997 1972-1997
Constant 0.12 0.03 0.05
∆(prices)t 0.04
(2.0)
∆(prices)t-1 -0.05
(2.7)
0.002
(1.1)
∆(unemployment 15-24 without degree)t 0.05
(2.4)
0.011
(4.1)
0.007
(2.1)
∆(marriage, reversed)t 0.51
(2.9)
Residualst-1
-0.21
(2.1)
Residualst-2
-0.12
(0.9)
-0.36
(2.7)
-0.04
(0.3)
R
2
0.34 0.49 0.46
F significant at 0.03 0.001 0.007
Durbin-Watson 2.1 1.9 1.7
   
   
   
) 
                        D
ocum
ent téléchargé depuis w
w
w
.cairn.info - Institut d'E
tudes P
olitiques de P
aris -   - 193.54.67.93 - 15/12/2015 15h53. ©
 P
resses de S
ciences P
o (P
.F.N
.S
.P
.) 
In the second half of the period studied,1975-98, the role of delinquency
“supply”; ie, the potentially delinquent proportion of the population, was af-
firmed. The lasting slow-down in economic growth (15) turned crime into an
activity dominated by supply thus defined, though this was probably tempo-
rary. With recession and widespread increase in unemployment, this second
impetus to crime and delinquency resulted in the rate rising higher and faster
than at any other time. Increased unemployment functioned as an incentive
not to play by the rules, one that passed from older to younger brothers. In ef-
fect, for boys who had just barely reached the age at which compulsory
schooling ends in France –boys who were not personally on the job market–
the possibilities and difficulty of engaging in legal activity were perceptible
essentially through the experiences of brothers and male friends of brothers
and sisters. This process does not presuppose individual awareness of the eco-
nomic context, but rather the perceptible experience of members of the child’s
closest circle, and it affected a series of aggregating micro-decisions
(Lagrange, 2000).
There seems to me no grounds for interpreting differential unemployment
rates in France or increased income inequality in the Netherlands and United
Kingdom as indicators associated with cost-benefit type calculations made by
individuals. These features more likely bring into play relations between dif-
ferent social strata. They are macrosocial indices of society’s degree of cohe-
sion. For the case at hand, long-term increased unemployment and inequality
gave a fraction of the most underprivileged boys the feeling that the social
contract had been broken, and this in turn made it seem legitimate to them to
break the citizens’ pact and its insistence on respect for others’ property and
persons. The degree of violence in citizen relations thus seems linked to a
feeling that the social and political domains are characterized by injustice.
If the improvement in employment prospects that has made itself felt since
1998 comes to extend to the least-educated young people, it may yet reduce
the propensity to become delinquent. This can only happen if that improve-
ment is not compromised by the logic of opportunity, tied as it is to an in-
crease in inflation, and if public policy in France at both state and regional
levels reinforces actions in favor of integrating unskilled young people who
have been rejected by the school system.
Hugues LAGRANGE
Observatoire Sociologique du Changement – FNSP-CNRS
27, rue Saint-Guillaume – 75007 Paris France
Translation: Amy Jacobs
Previously published: RFS, 2001, 42, 1
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(15) Annual increase in the buying power of a manual worker’s wages was a mere 0.6% from
1975 to 1998, compared to 3.8% from 1945 to 1975.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX II. – The principle of error correction or ARIMA
(Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average) models
If Xt is the crime rate for year t and Ct the consumer price index for year t,
then a regression on raw data following equation:
(1) Xt=a+bCt+ut’
in the presence of a rising trend gives an extremely high coefficient of deter-
mination R
2
–and with it the illusion of a strong relation. But Durbin and Wat-
son’s autocorrelation of temporal residuals test is poor –far from 2.
(16)
This is
due to the fact that Xt and Ct (the latter representing the explanatory or inde-
pendent variable) are not stationary; in other words, they show tendency and
variance evolution over time. The two classically adopted solutions to this
problem consist in either removing one temporal trend from each series and
testing fit between crime and prices on gaps from the trend (using the series
X’t=Xt- t and C’t=Ct- t), or working on first differences, ie, Xt= Xt-Xt-1)
and ∆Ct= (Ct-Ct-1). But doing this means throwing the baby out with the bath
in that we lose any long-term link between series. The guiding idea behind er-
ror correction models is to determine whether trends for independent and de-
pendent variables are of the same type and if they balance each other. In
practice this implies checking that the shapes of the initial series, differenti-
ated to the same degree –first or second usually– are stationary. For example,
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APPENDIX I. – Theft increase rate and unemployment rate for persons under 25 without degree
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if ∆Xt and ∆Ct are stationary, that means Xt and Ct have degree 1
cointegration. The results are then adjusted, in a procedure that uses both
short- and long-term links, by calculating the residuals ût on the basis of (1)
and reintegrating them into equation:
(2) ∆Xt=a’+b’ Ct+c’ût-1+ t’
where ût-1 is the residual of the first regression, lagged one period.
∈t is the classic error term of 0 mean, such that cov ( t, t-1) = 0.
Analysis of correlograms enables us to determine time-series autocorrelation
values for different time lags (example: Xt, Xt-k correlation).
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APPENDIX III. – Trends for theft, violent theft, assault and battery, homicide, 1972-1988
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